ABOUT THE AUTHORS: S. Frederick Starr, is a distinguished fellow specializing in Central Asia and the Caucasus at the American Foreign Policy Council and founding chairman of the Central Asia Caucasus Institute.
The Republic of Georgia faces a critical juncture ahead of parliamentary elections in October 2024 as escalating political tensions, driven by the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party's increasingly authoritarian tendencies, threaten the country’s democratic future and its pro-Western trajectory. This situation demands a nuanced understanding of Georgia's complex political landscape and a strategic response from Western partners. Here, a number of trends are noteworthy.
The first is democratic backsliding and a consolidation of authoritarian power. Georgian Dream, once a self-identified social democratic reformist coalition, has embraced right-wing populism and consolidated power in recent years. Its controversial "foreign agent" law, which went into force on August 1st, is clearly aimed at silencing critical NGOs and media ahead of national elections, and represents a blatant attempt to curtail media freedom, target civil society, and suppress dissent.
These policies, which are closely aligned with Russian information operations in the region, are reminiscent of cyclical patterns in Georgia's contemporary history – entailing "democratic breakthrough, democratic advance, democratic rollback, authoritarian consolidation, regime weakening, and regime collapse." Today, the country appears headed for another round of the same. This pattern reflects entrenched challenges in Georgia's political culture, including a tendency towards centralization of power, a disconnect between elites and the broader population, and a zero-sum approach to politics where losing power is seen as an existential threat.
The second are the shifting power dynamics in Georgian society. A new generation, disillusioned by GD's policies and yearning for a European future, is at the forefront of today’s opposition, shifting the locus of resistance from traditional political parties to street protests. Youth see the West as Georgia's only viable path, but their impact is limited by their concentration in the national capital, easy disillusionment and high standards, as well as potential election apathy or disorganization. Despite these potential pitfalls, this generational divide creates a possible opportunity for a new political class to emerge, uniting youth activism with experienced civil society actors. This could happen, post-election, if the remnants of the old elite political class emigrate amid government crackdown.
Third, we are witnessing an erosion of public trust. In recent months, governmental actions have played on existing societal issues like corruption, inequality, and a sense of injustice, fueling widespread discontent and emigration. Nevertheless, the opposition is currently weak and disorganized, and has not shown any focus on these issues. Opposition dynamics continue to be largely centered on mostly unpopular personalities in the political elite, rather than any particular socio-political movement. However, popular discontent with GD has crested because of its anti-Western and anti-democratic positions, which gives even a fractured opposition a potential opportunity heading into the elections. The escalating use of force against largely peaceful protesters has only deepened the chasm between the government and the people. Emigration from Georgia doubled in 2023, primarily driven by those seeking work abroad. And Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index indicates a notable three point decline for Georgia over the past year.
Finally, there is a misunderstanding of how Georgians see "The West." U.S. foreign policy professionals often underestimate the deep-seated resentment towards the former ruling party, the United National Movement (UNM), and overestimate the depth of pro-Western sentiment in Georgia. The prevalent narrative of overwhelming pro-Western sentiment in Georgia, often quantified as 80-85% support, is simplistic and in some respects misleading, ignoring complex realities on the ground. While the pro-west moorings of the population are resilient, they are tempered by popular frustration with Western inattention and popular prioritization of local socioeconomic issues.
Western actors bear some responsibility for this state of affairs, often equating Westernization with superficial markers like proficiency in English. The West has also largely taken pro-west sentiments for granted, and shown little initiative to integrate Georgia into Euro-Atlantic structures – giving anti-Western actors an opportunity to gain ground. Moreover, for a certain segment of the Georgian population that is quite poor and lists economic issues at the top of its concern, support for the West is shallow. For these voters, the populist, right-wing narrative (stressing order, stability, unity, and control over culture,) may be more comfortable and understandable.
HIGH STAKES FOR THE FUTURE OF GEORGIAN DEMOCRACY
Against this backdrop, the upcoming parliamentary elections are crucial, with a high likelihood of GD resorting to fraud to maintain its grip on power. As such, the potential for post-election unrest and violence is significant, with a legitimate risk of external actors, particularly Russia, exploiting the instability for their own benefit. As a result, the U.S., historically (though unintentionally) indifferent to the nuances of Georgian politics, now faces a critical inflection point in its relationship with Georgia.
Here, a nuanced American policy – one that strengthens democratic institutions, imposes consequences for anti-democratic behavior, and doubles down on support for Georgia’s pluralistic development – would go a long way toward setting Tbilisi on the right path once more. By leveraging diplomatic, economic, and security tools, the U.S. and its allies can play a crucial role in supporting Georgia's democratic future. But this support must be coupled with a clear-eyed assessment of the challenges involved, and with a willingness to impose concrete consequences for democratic backsliding.
Ultimately, it remains up to Georgians to seize this moment and chart a course towards a more stable, prosperous, and democratic future. Washington’s job is to give them the tools to do so.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
Laura Linderman is Senior Fellow and Program Manager at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the American Foreign Policy Council.
Major recent shifts, starting with the Taliban victory in Afghanistan and Russia’s war in Ukraine have led to a resurgence of the Trans-Caspian transportation corridor. This corridor, envisioned in the 1990s, has been slow to come to fruition, but has now suddenly found much-needed support. The obstacles to a rapid expansion of the corridor’s capacity are nevertheless considerable, given the underinvestment in its capacity over many years.
For the first time in three decades, the establishment of formidable Trans-Caspian infrastructure has become viable. Shortly following the collapse of the USSR, the United States, the EU and most states of Central Asia and the Caucasus sought to establish Trans-Caspian trade and transport routes, initially focusing particularly on energy, and envisioned these routes as an essential strategic component of linking the region to the West and strengthening the political and economic independence of the countries of the region. Despite close to thirty years of policy efforts, these forces did not succeed in establishing infrastructure that would link both sides of the Caspian Sea in a manner that makes this a corridor for considerable transport of goods or energy. This, however, may be changing. Events in 2022 and 2023 have accelerated efforts of the states in the region to establish viable infrastructure links across the Caspian Sea.
The good news is that friends of Ukraine have largely succeeded in overcoming the artificial and self-destructive taboo against supporting
Unacknowledged in large parts of official Washington is the reality that thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians have had to pay for this procrastination with their lives. Had there been a hundred or more F-16 fighter jets in the Ukrainian skies a year ago, this cursed war would now be history.
Meanwhile, the US’s puzzling taboo has
Not one US official has publicly admitted that this line has been adopted. Worse, some act as if it doesn’t exist. While his colleagues in the White House have dragged their feet on providing Ukraine with military aircraft, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has unambiguously asserted
An illuminating article
At Biden’s behest, CIA Director William Joseph Burns established direct communication with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow as early as in November 2021, that is three months before Russia launched its full-scale attack on Ukraine.
"In some ironic ways… the meeting was highly successful," a senior US
But, according to Newsweek, “Once Russian forces poured into Ukraine, the United States had to quickly shift gears. The CIA, like the rest of the U.S. intelligence community, had misread Russia's military capacity and Ukraine's resilience as Russia failed to take Kyiv and withdrew from the north.”
Nevertheless, certain clandestine rules of the road apparently agreed to by Burns and Putin were adhered to by the US side. Washington would prohibit Ukraine from carrying out strikes on Russian territory. And, in return, speaking as if for all NATO, Burns sought and gained a promise from the dictator not to attack NATO member countries.
Burns met with Russian foreign intelligence chief Sergei Naryshkin in Ankara in November 2022 and then is believed to have briefed Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky about his “non-agreement” with the Russians.
Far from criticizing Burns, Arkin emoted on the CIA’s difficulties in keeping an eye on the increasingly unruly Ukrainians, who repeatedly attempted to deliver strikes on targets both in Russian occupied Crimea and Russia itself.
Naryshkin revealed that he and Burns discussed, "thought about and deliberated on what should be done about Ukraine" in a lengthy phone call on June 30, initiated by the US side.
Over the 560+ days of Russia’s so-called “special military operation,” and tens of thousands of documented warcrimes, instances of torture, shootings and rape, Burns and the CIA have remained silent on Russia, while apparently issuing threats to Ukraine. On July 5, a CIA spokesperson warned that if Kyiv continued acts of sabotage within Russia it could have “disastrous consequences.”
What other catastrophic consequences are the people in Burn’s office expecting will occur through the fault of the Ukrainians?
All thinkable and unthinkable catastrophes have already happened as a result of the covert Burns-Putin deal. Yet Newsweek was beside itself with pride at Burns’ diplomatic success and expressed anger at the Ukrainians for
The bipartisan pro-Ukrainian majority in the post-vacation Congress would do well to organize hearings to which they should invite Blinken, Burns, Arkin and those sources in the CIA whom he cites in his article. They should also invite National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, who has been singing in the same key as Burns.
The hearings should seek answers
1. Does there exist an agreement between the governments of the US and the Russian Federation about “rules of the road” of the Russo-Ukrainian war?
2. If so, why were Congress and the American people unaware of them until now?
3. If not, then on what basis is Burns imposing these “road rules” on Ukraine?
4. Should Congress even regard Burns’
We do not have to live in such a world and accept the rules they seek to impose on us.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS:
Dr. Frederick Starr, a co-founder (with George Kennan and James Billington) of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, is chairperson of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, and has written two dozen books on Russia and the USSR.
Dr. Andrei Piontkovsky is a Russian scientist, political writer and analyst, member of International PEN Club who was forced to leave Russia in 2016. For many years he has been a regular political commentator for the BBC World Service, Radio Liberty, and Voice of America. Piontkovsky is the author of several books on the Putin presidency. In 2017, Piontkovsky was awarded the Andrei Sakharov Prize for “Courage in Journalism.”