By Omar Sadr

This paper proposes a theory of democratic pluralism instead of democratic minimalism developed by Shadi Hamid in his book “The Problem of Democracy”. Democratic pluralism will leverage pluralism to create a possibility for reconciliation between liberalism, secularism, religion, and democracy. It presents a framework of democratic pluralism based on four key elements: (1) a conception of democracy that includes performance and political action in the public sphere beyond electoral participation; (2) recognition of diversity and intercultural dialog, alongside the agonistic dimension of pluralism; (3) moderation of individual autonomy and identity politics; and (4) pluralistic accommodation of religion. The paper critiques Hamid’s monolithic notions of liberalism, secularism, and democracy, suggesting that more nuanced approaches to these concepts are necessary. It contends that rather than abandoning liberalism and secularism, exploring compatible versions of liberalism and Islam within a pluralistic framework offers a more promising path for reforming religion and polity in the Muslim world.

Introduction

Shadi Hamid’s theory of democratic minimalism is more accurately about the problem of liberalism. It comes at a time when liberalism is in tension, if not in crisis, both in America and around the world. In the West, the problem is multi-faceted, ranging from eroding trust in liberal democratic institutions to the rise of populism, and democratic backsliding. The tension has made many scholars reflect on what went wrong.

In the Muslim world, the tension is older, deeper, and more classic in nature. It is between Islam and its Sharia as a moral system and liberalism as a hegemonic global paradigm. Presupposing that the incompatibility of liberalism with Islam rendered democracy impossible in the region, democratic minimalism suggests the decoupling of liberalism and democracy as a solution. It argues that democracy prevails if we abandon liberalism and secularism. In policy terms, it suggests the US not pursue liberalism and secularism as an end to its relations with the Muslim world. In doing so, it perpetuates a monolithic notion of liberalism, secularism, and Islamism. This paper constructively deconstructs democratic minimalism’s monoliths. It suggests that, instead of abandoning liberalism and secularism, one has to explore which versions of liberalism and Islam could be compatible with a pluralistic order. Moreover, instead of placing democracy as the end state, the Muslim world should consider pluralism as a framework to reform religion and polity. This would necessitate a more nuanced approach toward liberalism, eschewing mere rejection or adoption.

This paper suggests democratic pluralism based on at least four key elements (1) a notion of democracy based on political action in the public sphere besides electoral participation (2) recognition of cultural diversity, and intercultural dialog along with the agonistic dimension of pluralism; (3) moderation of individual autonomy and identity politics; and (4) twin tolerance as a standard of pluralist secularism.

What does democratic minimalism entail?

Hamid builds the theory of democratic minimalism based on segregating values that he does not consider intrinsic to democracy. In this analysis, only democratic legitimacy, political stability, and the peaceful transfer of power are intrinsically related to democracy (Hamid, 2023 p. 53). In other words, the purpose of democracy at the minimalist level is its ability to function as a mechanism for conflict resolution. He argues that values such as liberalism and social justice or issues such as economic development are not intrinsic values of democracy; rather, they are by-products of democracy or accidentally attached to democracy (Hamid, 2023 p. 54). However, it is not clear from the Hamid’s analysis who is to decide what is intrinsic to democracy and what is not. The choices are arbitrary. Why should stability be considered intrinsic to democracy but economic development not be? In other words, how is short-term stability minimal to be accepted as inherent to a minimalistic democracy?

The Hamid reconceptualizes the Schumpeterian notion of democracy with a particular policy mandate. Although the Hamid’s main critique of the Schumpeterian notion of democracy is its instrumentalization of democracy as a particular mechanism of elite decision-making, he reproduces a different version of instrumentalized democracy. For Hamid, a minimalist notion of democracy is a means to reorient the US foreign policy in West Asia and North Africa (WANA)1 from endorsing liberal autocrats to supporting democracies where Islamists may come to power. Moreover, his justification for the signification of democracy falls in the same end-oriented trap: he argues that the purpose of democracy is to create legitimacy or stability through predictability. In other words, Hamid justifies democracy based on what political scientists Jack Knight and James Johnson call a set of first-order functions of institutions.

In their book, The Priority of DemocracyKnight and Johnson (2011) distinguish between the first and second-order tasks of institutions. The first-order task of the institution refers to the function of an institution in how it addresses certain social, economic, or political challenges. On the contrary, the second-order task of an institution refers to a meta-level where the institutions manage and determine effective institutional arrangements. Knight and Johnson suggest that “benefits of democracy are derived from its second-order effects: the way in which democratic institutional arrangements facilitate effective institutional choice” (Knight and Johnson, 2011 p. 20). The first-order function of an institution is to resolve the problem of collective action and generate short-term stability by creating predictability and legitimacy. The second-order function is how the process of effective and efficient institutional arrangement should be. Hamid does not articulate whether the concept of minimalist democracy seeks to address the first-order task or the second-order function of institutions. Contra to Hamid’s approach, a democratic minimalist should consider democracy as a second-order task. Nonetheless, the Hamid does not engage with the existing body of literature on democracy from the collective action and institutionalist theories. This negligence results in an analytical error.

Moreover, Hamid takes it for granted that democracy is a mechanism for conflict resolution and, hence, short-term stability. In fact, there are cases such as the failure of republican Afghanistan (2001–2021) where democracy did not succeed in the test of being a mechanism for conflict resolution. If democracy by itself does not function as a conflict resolution mechanism, then other qualities and factors should be considered.

Potential limitations of “democratic minimalism”

The concept of democratic minimalism is not novel. Earlier theorists of democracy have talked about similar types of democracy. The Schumpeterian notion of democracy is considered a minimalist notion of democracy as it limits democracy to only a mechanism for aggregation of citizens’ preferences.

A minimalist democracy presents at least theoretical and methodological errors. On the theoretical front, minimalist democracy does not capture non-electoral forms of political participation. Wedeen’s (2008 p. 103–147) study of Yemen shows how qat chews function as miniature public spheres. Yemeni social interactions are frequently structured around the communal consumption of qāt, a stimulant leaf ingested daily during gatherings. These “qāt chews” function as a nexus for multifaceted discursive exchanges among participants of varying degrees of familiarity. Such gatherings facilitate a broad spectrum of dialogs, notably encompassing intensive deliberations on overtly political subjects. This social phenomenon serves as a significant conduit for public discourse and sociopolitical engagement within Yemeni society. For Wedeen, qat chews are a “site for the performance of citizenship for the critical self-assertion of citizens the existence of whom is made possible through these exercises of deliberation” (Wedeen, 2008 p. 120). These mini-public spheres facilitate political participation and deliberation beyond electoral contestation in authoritarian circumstances. A theoretical framework that does not account for discursively organized political action in the public sphere would render understanding democracy incomplete.

On the methodological front, minimalist democracy does not have utility beyond the large N and transhistorical studies. Stripping down democracy from all substantive qualities would only allow a binary or nominal notion of democracy in methodological terms. In other words, a nominal classification would not allow the possibility of understanding various forms and practices of democracy. For instance, Przeworski et al. argue that “alternative definitions of democracy give rise to almost identical classifications of the actual observations” (Przeworski, 2009 p. 10). This is because the minimalist notion of democracy is exclusively generated from its methodology. Apart from electoral participation, democracy can be practiced through several channels that a minimalist democracy does not accommodate.

To distinguish democracy from liberalism, one does not need to take refuge in a minimalist notion of democracy. Instead, a substantive model of democracy also provides the possibility of doing this. Wedeen’s analysis of Yemen qat chews public sphere highlights how one can conceptually and practically distinguish between liberalism and democracy. She states, “Qāt chews are the occasion for performing an explicitly democratic subjectivity—one that relishes deliberation—but it does not follow that such occasions necessarily produce explicitly liberal debates or forms of personhood” (Wedeen, 2008 p. 145). To do this, Wedeen suggests that political analysis should theorize “performative practices” rather than “the values to which people subscribe” (ibid: 145).

Similar to Wedeen’s analysis of Yemen, I conclude in my paper on “Failed Democracy in Afghanistan (2001–2021): Lack of Deliberation and Pluralism” (Sadr, 2024), that the lack of space for an agonistic public sphere negatively impacted electoral participation which eventually ended in the failure of a Republic in Afghanistan. One cannot understand democratic practices in the authoritarian Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2001–2021) if one exclusively focuses on electoral mechanisms and neglects alternative practices such as that of the mini-publics.

Relativism and modernisation theory

Hamid is right that Americans should not bother about liberalism and its related values to enlightenment projects overseas. In other words, the U.S. should not export liberalism or put a liberal conditionality in its relations with WANA. However, his reasoning on the question of why is incorrect. He argues that WANA societies follow fundamentally opposing values to that of the US. As a result, the US negates the outcome of democracy if the winner is not desirable. To fix this policy error, Hamid erodes the conceptual integrity of democracy by reducing it to a mechanism of aggregation of preferences of individuals. The question that emerges here is: why do we have to redefine democracy to fix a US foreign policy problem? Cannot we address the pitfall of US policy in West Asia without ignoring the values attached to democracy?

This leads me to assert that Hamid’s diagnosis of the puzzle is incorrect. The problem is not with the values often associated with democracy; rather, the problem is with the ideational basis of the US foreign policy in West Asia, namely modernization theory. The secularist modernizing autocratic states of the region are a byproduct of an approach that enforced an enlightenment model of modernization from above using the state apparatus. These autocratic states often received diplomatic endorsement, strategic partnership, financial assistance, and many more benefits from the US for the same policies (Hashemi, 2009).

Hamid’s concept of “democratic minimalism” by itself infers a sort of relativism. As the concept is developed for and in the context of WANA, it indicates the region is unique compared to the rest of the world. In a sense, it demands a distinct methodological measurement and a particularistic policy treatment for the region as far as democracy is concerned. It presents an exceptional solution to the question of democracy in the region. It provides a certain form of exemption for the region to be considered a democracy. This exemption is presently based on a culturalist analysis which precludes the region from the cultural elements of liberalism. This itself generates a sort of relativism.

In fact, democratic minimalism distinguishes political and cultural liberalism. This distinction is built across the line between progressiveness versus conservativeness. West Asia is pushed to the realm of conservatism so that the denial of certain elements of liberalism is justified.

A monolith notion of liberalism

Hamid adopts a universal notion of liberalism and takes the enlightenment notion of liberalism for granted. It is out of such a monolithic notion of liberalism that Hamid’s decoupling of democracy and liberalism ends in a minimalist democracy. An intellectual critic of liberalism is incomplete if one does not acknowledge and engage with different strands of liberalism.

Alternative versions of liberalism include liberal pluralism (Galston, 2002Daher, 2009) and modus vivendi liberalism (Gray, 2000). Both of these two versions of liberalism challenge the proposition that considers individual autonomy as the one and only core value of liberalism. William Galston distinguishes two types of liberalism: “one based on the core value of individual rational autonomy, the other on respect for legitimate difference—and argues for the diversity-based approach as offering a better chance for individuals and groups to live their lives in accordance with their distinctive conceptions of what gives meaning and value to life” (Galston, 2002 p. 10).

The problem with the US democracy promotion is not the fact that it promotes liberal values in West Asia; rather, the problem is that it promotes a narrow ideological version of liberalism based on an exclusive emphasis on individual autonomy. In fact, this is not just a pathology of US foreign policy. Liberalism has been in crisis in US domestic affairs as well. Political scientist Francis Fukuyama argues that US liberalism has been stretched both in its right and left spectrum of ideology. On the left, the concept of individual autonomy has broadened to the extent that it has led to identity politics; on the right, it has led to “neoliberalism” which has caused inequality and a gap between the rich and the poor (Fukuyama, 2022). The contention over what liberalism entails or not is to the extent some liberals do not accept the conceptualization of neoliberalism. While commonly misused as a negative term for capitalism in general, neoliberalism more accurately refers to a specific economic philosophy. This school of thought, closely linked to the University of Chicago and the Austrian School, is championed by economists such as Milton Friedman, Gary Becker, George Stigler, Ludwig von Mises, and Friedrich Hayek who criticized state intervention in economic affairs and advocated for free markets as the primary drivers of economic growth and resource allocation. One comprehensive definition of neoliberalism is given by the University of Chicago political scientist, Lisa Wedeen, who qualifies neoliberalism with four key factors: Economic stability measures that prioritize low inflation and minimal public debt, while moving away from Keynesian approaches to managing economic cycles; Opening up trade and reducing financial regulations; Shifting publicly-owned companies and assets into private hands; and Scaling back social welfare programs and government support systems (Wedeen, 2008 p. 187). The New School political theorist, Nancy Fraser considers the latest version of capitalism as neoliberalism which succeeded state-managed capitalism of the post-war era. Issues previously seen as the domain of democratic decision-making are relegated to market forces. Central Banks, global financial institutions, and transnational governance structures such as WTO, NAFTA, and TRIPS who make the rules are not accountable to the public. This shift primarily serves the interests of financial institutions and large corporations. According to Fraser, this process has led to de-democratization (Fraser, 2022 p. 126–130).

To fix liberalism both in domestic and foreign affairs, the solution is not to de-couple liberalism and democracy. Instead, the solution is to craft a pluralistic conception of liberalism. As I argue in my book Negotiating Cultural Diversity, a theory of governance of diversity should encompass three elements: liberalism’s conception of individual autonomy complemented by an appreciation of cultural diversity and the development of a capacity for intercultural dialog. The intercultural dialog should acknowledge the agonistic dimension of pluralism by underscoring the power dynamics in the public sphere. As mentioned in the previous section beyond electoral politics our theories should also consider the political action in the public sphere. While pluralism is not an exclusive feature of liberalism, democratic pluralism can not be built without a moderate notion of individual autonomy. A pluralist liberalism will endorse moderation that scholars such as Fukyama and Aurelian Craiutu have suggested. Moderation on the conception of individual autonomy to control identity politics and inequality.

A monolith notion of secularism

Similar to his monolith notion of liberalism, Hamid’s notion of secularism is also monolithic. Hamid criticizes secularism as it distinguishes religion and politics and considers public religiosity as “a problem to be resolved” (Hamid, 2023 p. 60). This is not possible except with coercion, according to him. In WANA, he only highlights authoritarian secular regimes such as Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia. Hamid also takes secularism as a defining benchmark for democracy-religion dynamics. Both of these assumptions are misleading. As political scientist Alfred Stepan discussed, there is a diverse set of secular regimes both in democratic and authoritarian states. Hence, secularism cannot be a good element of religion-democracy (Stepan, 2000 p. 43). While many political scientists make an empirical error in considering secularism as a necessary condition of democracy, Hamid creates a reverse fallacy by proposing the negation of secularism as a necessary condition for a minimalist democracy.

Like Hamid, Stepan considered democracy as a mechanism of conflict resolution. The difference is in how the two authors interpreted this process. For democracy to be a mechanism of conflict resolution, Stepan suggested the principle of “twin toleration,” which means that both state and religion tolerate and respect each other. Stepan explains, “The minimal degree of toleration that democracy needs to receive or induce from religion and the minimal degree of toleration that religion (and civil society, more generally) needs to receive or induce from the state for the polity to be democratic” (Stepan, 2011: p. 116).

Based on this, Stepan distinguished four versions of secularism: (1) separatist secularism where a full separation of state and religion is ensured, such as that of France (1905–1959): in this version, the state bans any form of religious practices and symbol not just in politics in general, but more specifically in the state (2) the established religion secularism, such as those of the Nordic countries, where the state has an official church; (3) the positive accommodation secularism where the state cooperates with churches, for example, in collecting church taxes, the state funds religious institutions, such as that of Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and Germany; and (4) the “respect all, positive cooperation, principled distance” secularism of Nehruvian and Gandhian India, Senegal, and Indonesia. In this model, the state goes a bit further than the positive accommodation secularism wherein it allows multiple religions in the public sphere at the same time. In Europe, it’s only Christianity that is accommodated. Muslims find it difficult to assert their identity as a group. In Indonesia, at least five religions including Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism are treated equally. A secularism that respects diversity and treats all religions equally is also called evenhanded secularism (Monsma and Soper, 2009).

Democratic minimalism embraces the public role of religion and the fact that religious parties should be allowed to participate in the democratic process. It assumes that allowing Islamist parties in elections would resolve the issues of diversity. But how can we somehow govern or manage pluralism if the religious-based parties in power neglect or violate diversity? Consider, for instance, certain decisions in Muslim-majority countries such as a ban on alcohol. The answer is evenhanded secularism which subscribes to the idea of equality, not to the idea of separation of religion and state.

Democratic minimalism also cannot respond to a case such as Pakistan where Islamist parties have been enjoying political participation (Nelson, 2017). However, the dilemma is that they also have parallel militant wings. If politics is the end of the war, does minimalist democracy lead us to this goal? The case of Pakistan’s democracy does not give us the outcome that the theory of democratic minimalism desires. Instead, Stepan’s principle of twin tolerance would require the state to take action against those religious-based parties that violate twin tolerance.

Hamid is correct that the autocratic states’ promise of religious reform is shallow. He rightly asks that, since religion and politics are intertwined, how can an autocratic state that does not accommodate dissent tolerate religious reform? While this concern is valid, research also shows that liberalism followed religious reformation in the West. Without religious reformation, which justified tolerance and individual rights from a religious standpoint, liberalism would not have been possible. Political Scientist Nader Hashimi discusses how prominent liberal philosopher John Locke played a leading role in developing and defending tolerance albeit with reference to the teachings of Christianity. Locke’s theology was “rooted in a dissenting religious exegesis” (Hashemi, 2009 p. 68).

Similar to the contemporary Muslim world, in the Middle Ages, Christianity was an intolerant society with continuous waves of religious wars, persecution of heretics and apostasy, and the brutal role of the Pope. Like many Muslim scholars who fled the Muslim world in fear of prosecution in the 21st century, Locke had to leave Britain in 1683 for the Netherlands. Following that, he wrote two crucial books: A Letter Concerning Toleration in 1685 and Two Treatises of Government in 1689. In the earlier book, he distinguished between a true Christian and a true church from an intolerant one. He also advocated for religious pluralism—no church has the authority to declare the other heretical, since all churches are equal. He challenged the role of clerics saying that there is no evidence in the Bible to support their legitimacy. In the latter book, Locke engaged with Sir Robert Filmer, a traditionalist and royalist author. By refuting Filmer’s account of traditional authority, Locke presented an account of individual liberty based on divine providence. According to Hashimi, “Filmer (unlike Locke) attempted to explicitly integrate into his political philosophy the writings of non-Christian thinkers such as Aristotle and Cicero, while Locke’s authoritative references are decidedly and exclusively Christian—the Anglican theologian Richard Hooker and Jesus Christ” (Hashemi, 2009 p. 87).

Therefore, the path to an organic ideational and social transformation of the Muslim communities toward democracy and liberalism is rooted in a thorough religious reformation. Hamid’s suspicion of UAE’s model of interfaith summits or Morocco’s Sufi Islam as a path toward liberty and pluralism could be as legitimate as these regimes are authoritarian (Hamid, 2023 p. 72). Nonetheless, a bottom-up religious reformation that can generate discursively organized political action in the public sphere will create an efficient endogenous momentum for liberalization in the Muslim world.

Hamid’s thoughts on Islamic reformation remain conflicted. Initially, he debunks the idea of Islamic reformation altogether as he assumes it has already happened in the past (Ibid: 75), but later he suggests that Islamic reformation was never shaped against religious despotism. He argues, ‟Islam never experienced something resembling the Protestant Reformation—in part because it did not need one” (Ibid: 212). If the Islamist shift toward political pluralism in the post-Cold War was technical, without any ideological reappraisal as Hamid argues (Ibid: 217), then why is there no need for an Islamic reformation? In contrast to Hamid, I suggest that an Islamic reformation is a much-needed reform in the Muslim world to address under-development and three versions of Islamism: conservative Islamism, radical Islamism, and militant Islamism. I borrow this typology from Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senzai. While all these versions of Islamism do not accept democracy in principle, their reaction to it comes in different shades. The conservative Islamists exemplified by Egypt’s Noor party and Gamaa al-Islamiyah do not accept pluralism but accept procedural democracy or minimalist democracy to use Hamid’s term. The radical and militant Islamists categorically reject democracy and pluralism with two different approaches. The earlier one adopts religious and social activism such as that of Hizb Tahrir and the latter pursues a violent approach such as the Taliban, ISIS, and Al-Qaida (Bokhari and Senzai, 2013 p. 28–30).

Other political scientists such as Ahmet Kuru reiterate the need for reformation in Islam: “In order to solve contemporary problems of authoritarianism, patriarchy, and religious discrimination, Muslim countries need creative intellectuals (i.e., thinkers who criticize established perspectives and produce original alternatives)” (Kuru, 2019 p. 5).

A reductionist notion of plurality in the Muslim world

Hamid’s account of pluralism in West Asia offers valuable insights, but there are nuances to consider. He argues, “ideological diversity of Arab societies is very much a modern condition…Before the advent of modernity, few if any Muslims questioned the idea of Islamic law. They may have disagreed vehemently with particular legal interpretations or how laws were implemented, but that the law had a divine source was not in question” (Hamid, 2023 p. 63). To Hamid pluralism is a modern phenomenon. Therefore he judges the premodern Muslim society based on a modern standard. This ends in presentism where two incommensurable eras are considered by the same measure. Conceptions of “the good” vary significantly across generations and historical periods, often proving incompatible. Evaluating past cultures through the lens of contemporary values is methodologically problematic, risking anachronistic judgments and misinterpretation of historical contexts (Sadr, 2020 p. 25). Having said that, it is important to note that premodern Sharia was pluralistic in nature. Wael Hallaq argues legal pluralism is intrinsic to the framework of Islamic jurisprudence, a characteristic that distinguishes it from the monolithic legal structures often associated with modern nation-states. This pluralistic nature is manifested in two key aspects: firstly, in its recognition and incorporation of local customs as significant factors in legal deliberations, and secondly, in its accommodation of diverse interpretations regarding identical factual scenarios as well as heterogeneous interests across space and time. Far from being a monolith, Sharia was diverse from Northern Africa to Khurasan in Central Asia (Hallaq, 2014). The underlying principle for the mentioned pluralist Sharia is the appreciation of the fact that the premodern Sharia-based political order is fundamentally incompatible with the modern territorialized state which adopted a uniform and codified legal framework.

Moreover, Hamid ignores the rich pluralism that existed in the pre-Islamic and early Islamic era in Central and West Asia. As Fredric Starr argues about the early age of Islam,

Conversion proceeded very slowly. Indeed, Muslim theologians themselves acknowledged that many people of other faiths nominally adopted Islam but did not abandon their prior beliefs. The British classicist Peter Brown speaks of Islam resting “lightly, like a mist” over the highly diverse religious landscape. Only in the combative eleventh century did pluralism come to be seen as an evil and as a threat to the prevailing orthodoxy (Starr, 2013 p. 99).

Hamid takes the hegemony of Sharia for granted. The question one has to answer is how Sharia turned into a hegemonic system eschewing pluralism. This old pluralism of Central Asia was erased as conflict between Islam’s different orthodox sects took its place. For instance, Fredric Starr argues, “It may not be a coincidence that the sharpest conflicts between Sunni and Shiite Muslims arose after the year 1,000, just as the old pluralism was everywhere beginning to fade” (Starr, 2013 p. 518).

Conclusion: balancing liberalism with pluralism

How can we settle politics in a deeply divided society through democracy or alternative models? Democratic minimalism is correct that ideological liberalism cannot resolve the issue of peaceful coexistence in a pluralistic society of West Asia. However, it is incorrect on the point that a minimalist democracy can accomplish the task. Liberalism presents a certain end state and wants us to agree on that. In most of the cases, those end states are value-driven which may be contentious for some others who would not subscribe to it. Liberalism does not have that capacity as it endorses a substantial pluralistic notion of a good life (Sadr, 2020). However, the theory of minimalist democracy cannot bind societies together either. It is thin enough to have the capacity to hold a complex pluralistic society together. What we need is a substantial idea of plurality. That’s not a procedure like democracy–a set of agreed-upon rules. The idea of plurality is so substantial that citizens have to believe in it and the state should endorse it. Pluralism balances the dilemma between liberalism, democracy, and Islam. The proposed democratic pluralism is founded on four components. First, a conceptualization of democracy that extends beyond mere electoral participation to encompass active political action in the public sphere. Second, the importance of acknowledging cultural diversity and fostering intercultural dialog, while simultaneously recognizing the agonistic nature of pluralism. Third, a balanced approach to individual autonomy and identity politics, tempering these concepts to prevent their potential excesses. Fourth, the principle of twin tolerance as a benchmark for pluralist secularism, promoting mutual respect between secular and religious entities. These four pillars collectively form a framework that aims to address the complexities of modern diverse societies including the Muslim world, offering a nuanced approach to democratic governance in an increasingly pluralistic world.

Read at Frontiers

Published in News
Monday, 09 September 2024 15:20

Rising Stakes in Tbilisi as Elections Approach

By Laura Linderman

As Georgia approaches parliamentary elections in October 2024, the South Caucasus state stands at a pivotal juncture. The growing authoritarian tendencies of the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party threaten to derail the nation’s democratic progress, and its aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration. In this critical moment, the United States needs to act decisively by leveraging congressional measures to support Georgia’s democratic institutions and counter authoritarian influences there.

The problem is acute, because GD appears increasingly willing to resort to drastic measures to maintain its grip on power. Recently, the party openly indicated that it would call for a ban on the country’s political opposition if it gains a constitutional majority in the upcoming elections. 

Georgia’s ruling party has reason to be concerned. Credible international polling by Edison Research suggests that GD is poised for a significant decline in vote share. Those figures reflect growing discontent among the Georgian populace, likely fueled by the government’s authoritarian measures and its failure to address critical economic and social issues. This contrasts sharply with less credible polling by GORBI, which claims GD is set to achieve an unrealistic majority—numbers that GD has never achieved, even at its height in 2012. The credibility of GORBI’s polling is further undermined by the significant public unrest and mass protests in the wake of the country’s passage of a controversial foreign agent law, which has only intensified public dissatisfaction.

It’s no wonder, then, that GD is contemplating potentially drastic political measures to prop up its authority. But its proposal signals a dangerous erosion of democratic norms, and highlights the need for international scrutiny and action, because the implications are profound – both for Georgia’s internal stability and for its international relationships, particularly with the United States and European Union.

Fortunately, Congressional remedies exist. Both the MEGOBARI Act in the House and the Senate’s Georgian People’s Act represent a bipartisan effort to address recent democratic backsliding in Georgia. They aim to impose financial sanctions on individuals undermining democratic processes and human rights, holding accountable those who threaten Georgia’s democratic future. Cumulatively, this legislation underscores the U.S. commitment to supporting the Georgian people, who overwhelmingly support Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration, and to countering malign influences, particularly from Russia. The both Acts’ power lies not only in punitive measures, but also in their potential to influence Georgia’s future trajectory by making it clear that the international community will not tolerate the erosion of democratic values.

The MEGOBARI Act, in particular, provides comprehensive incentives for the U.S. to strengthen Georgia’s democratic institutions based on real progress and reform. These incentives include negotiating a more robust trade agreement, enhancing exchanges and a streamlined visa regime, developing a comprehensive economic and modernization package, providing defense equipment and support, and offering a security assurance framework similar to the Ukraine G7 agreement. These positive incentives are essential to show both the Georgian government and its people that a commitment to democracy and reform will bring tangible benefits.

As Georgia faces the potential for electoral fraud and post-election unrest, this legislation (and its companion in the Senate) offers a critical toolkit for the U.S. to support Georgia’s democratic aspirations. Through them, the U.S. can help ensure a fair electoral process and counter external threats to Georgia’s sovereignty. Ultimately, congressional action should be about empowering Georgians to seize this moment and chart a course toward a more democratic and prosperous future. Washington’s role is to provide the necessary support and tools necessary for Georgia to succeed. 

The stakes are high, because the upcoming elections in Georgia represent not just a domestic political contest, but a defining moment for the country’s future. The international community, led by the United States, needs to be vigilant and proactive in ensuring that this future is democratic, prosperous, and aligned with the values that the Georgian people have repeatedly affirmed. 

Laura Linderman is Senior Fellow and Program Manager at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the American Foreign Policy Council

Published in Staff Publications
Thursday, 17 May 2018 17:47

Why Turkey Is Authoritarian

Why Turkey is Authoritarian

RIGHT-WING RULE FROM ATATÜRK TO ERDOGAN

Ataturk-Karaveli2
 
 

HALIL KARAVELI

Pluto Press

Distributed in the USA by the University of Chicago Press

Order on Amazon.com

208 pages | 5 1/4 x 8 1/2 | © 2018
 
For the past century, Turkey has been seen by many as always on the verge of becoming a truly Westernized liberal democracy—only to have democracy lose ground time and again to authoritarianism. Why has that been the pattern, and what role have culture, identity, and religion played in Turkey’s struggle with democracy?
            This book presents a clear analysis and explanation, showing how cultural prejudices about the Muslim world have informed ideological positions in a way that has ultimately disabled the left within Turkey, leaving it unable to transcend artificial cultural categories and promote broad democratic solidarity. As the populist right mounts challenges around the world, the history of “democracy” in Turkey offers instructive lessons for activists there and beyond.
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Ronald Grigor Suny, University of Michigan
“Informative, authoritative, and reliable, Karaveli's analysis of Turkish politics should be required reading for anyone who wants to understand Turkey's relentless retreat from democracy.” 
 

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News

  • Protests in Georgia | Laura Linderman
    Monday, 18 November 2024 16:37

     

    In Georgia, opposition parties have accused the pro-Russian Georgian Dream party of stealing recent elections, leading to protests and calls for an investigation into electoral violations. Discrepancies between official results and exit polls have sparked demands for snap elections supervised by an international body. The European Union has called for a thorough inquiry into allegations of voter intimidation and multiple voting. The protests are also a response to fears of Georgia shifting closer to Russia, with Western support at stake. The situation could lead to EU sanctions, further complicating Georgia’s aspirations for EU and NATO membership.

    For more details, check out the video.

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    https://www.silkroadstudies.org/publications/joint-center-publications/item/13520-rising-stakes-in-tbilisi-as-elections-approach.html

     

  • Greater Central Asia as a Component of U.S. Global Strategy
    Monday, 07 October 2024 13:50

    By S. Frederick Starr

    Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program
    Silk Road Paper
    October 2024

    Click to Download PDF

    Introduction

    Screenshot 2024-10-07 at 9.55.36 AMWhat should be the United States’ strategy towards Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the region of Greater Central Asia (GCA) as a whole? Should it even have one? Unlike most other world regions, these lands did not figure in US policy until the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Though the new Baltic states entered Washington’s field of vision in that year, in those cases the Department of State could recall and build upon America’s relations with independent Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania during the inter-war decades. For the US Government after 1991, GCA was defined less as sovereign states than as a group of “former Soviet republics” that continued to be perceived mainly through a Russian lens, if at all.  

    Over the first generation after 1991 US policy focused on developing electoral systems, market economies, anti-narcotics programs, individual and minority rights, gender equality, and civil society institutions to support them. Congress itself defined these priorities and charged the Department of State to monitor progress in each area and to issue detailed country-by-country annual reports on progress or regression. The development of programs in each area and the compilation of data for the reports effectively preempted many other areas of potential US concern. Indeed, it led to the neglect of such significant issues as intra-regional relations, the place of these countries in global geopolitics, security in all its dimensions, and, above all, their relevance to America’s core interests. On none of these issues did Congress demand annual written reports.  

    This is not to say that Washington completely neglected security issues in GCA. To its credit, it worked with the new governments to suppress the narcotics trade. However, instead of addressing other US-GCA core security issues directly, it outsourced them to NATO and its Partnership for Peace Program (PfP). During the pre-9/11 years, PfP programs in the Caucasus and Central Asia produced substantial results, including officer training at the U.S. Army’s program in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, and the Centrasbat, a combined battalion drawn from four Central Asian armies. But all these declined after 9/11 as America focused its attention on Afghanistan. 

    Today this picture has dramatically changed, and the changes all arise from developments outside the former Soviet states. First came America’s precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan, which brought important consequences. As the U.S. withdrew, new forces—above all China but also Russia and the Gulf States—moved in. Also, America’s pullout undercut the region’s champions of moderate Islam and reimposed a harsh Islamist regime in their midst. And, finally, because Central Asians have always considered Afghanistan as an essential part of their region and not just an inconvenient neighbor, they judged the abrupt U.S. pullout as a body blow to the region as a whole. Now the scene was dominated not by the U.S. but by China and Russia competing with each other. Both powers presented themselves as the new bulwarks of GCA security, and reduced the U.S. to a subordinate role. 

    While all this was going on, the expansion of China’s navy and of both Chinese and European commercial shipping called into question the overriding importance of transcontinental railroad lines and hence of GCA countries. Taken together, these developments marginalized the concerns and assumptions upon which earlier US strategy towards GCA had been based. With Afghanistan no longer a top priority, American officials refocused their attention on Beijing, Moscow, Ukraine, Israel, and Iran, in the process, increasing the psychological distance between Washington and the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus.  

    It did not help that no U.S. president had ever visited Central Asia or the Caucasus. This left the initiative on most issues to the GCA leaders themselves. Thus, it was Kazakhstan and not the State Department that proposed to the U.S. government to establish the C5+1 meetings. It was also thanks to pressure from regional leaders that the White House arranged for a first-ever (but brief) meeting between Central Asian presidents and the President of the United States, which took place in September 2023 on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. By comparison, over the previous year Messrs. Putin and Xi Jinping had both met with the regional presidents half a dozen times. Hoping against hope, the Central Asian leaders hailed the C5+1 meeting as a fresh start in their relations with Washington. Washington has done little to validate this 

     

    Additional Info
    • Author S. Frederick Starr
    • Publication Type Silk Road Paper
    • Published in/by CACI
    • Publishing date October 2024
  • Press-Release: The "International Kazak Language Society" Presented the Kazakh Translation of "Geniuses of their Time Ibn Sina, Biruni and Lost Enlightenment", in Washington DC
    Tuesday, 22 October 2024 13:36

     

     

    PRESS-RELEASE

    THE INTERNATIONAL “KAZAK LANGUAGE” SOCIETY PRESENTED THE KAZAKH TRANSLATION OF “GENIUSES OF THEIR TIME. IBN SINA, BIRUNI AND LOST ENLIGHTENMENT”, IN WASHINGTON D.C.

     

    Author Dr. Frederick Starr places great importance on  making his work accessible to a broad audience

    October 21, 2024, Washington D.C. | The American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC) in Washington, D.C., hosted the presentation of the Kazakh translation of the book, “Geniuses of Their Age: Ibn Sina, Biruni, and the Lost Enlightenment”, authored by the renowned American historian Dr. Frederick Starr. This translation was initiated and realized by the International Kazakh Language Society (Qazaq Tili), with the support of Freedom Holding Corp., and in collaboration with the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the USA.

    Dr. Starr's book, “The Genius of Their Age: Ibn Sina, Biruni, and the Lost Enlightenment “, explores the lives and contributions of two outstanding figures of the Eastern Enlightenment, Ibn Sina and Biruni, whose intellectual legacies shaped both Eastern and Western thought. It highlights their significant contributions to science, medicine, and philosophy, and their role in the broader development of human knowledge. A major portion of the narrative details their biographies, achievements, and the lasting impact of their work on the intellectual heritage of the world.

    This is the second translation of Dr. Starr's work into Kazakh, following the successful release of his first book, “Lost Enlightenment: Central Asia's Golden Age from the Arab Conquest to Tamerlane” by the International Kazakh Language Society.

     

    The translation of this latest work was inspired by and aligns with the vision outlined in Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s recent article, “Renaissance of Central Asia: On the Path to Sustainable Development and Prosperity.” In support of promoting a shared vision for Central Asian prosperity, the book, which sheds light on the region’s profound intellectual legacy, was translated into Kazakh and made accessible to the public.

    The book presentation was attended by the author of the book Dr. Frederick Starr, member of the Board of Directors of Freedom Holding Corp. Kairat Kelimbetov, and Rauan Kenzhekhan, President of the International Kazakh Language Society (Qazak Tii).

    "This book is a tribute to the brilliant minds of Ibn Sina and Biruni, who made monumental contributions to science and thought long before the European Renaissance. The book also honors other scholars such as al-Farabi, al-Khwarizmi, Omar Khayyam, Abu-Mahmud Khujandi, al-Ferghani, and others whose names have entered the world's intellectual heritage. These two geniuses from Central Asia not only pioneered in various fields of knowledge but also developed research methods that are still relevant today,” said Kairat Kelimbetov, member of the Board of Directors of Freedom Holding Corp. 

     

    Rauan Kenzhekhanuly, the President of the International Kazakh Language Society, emphasized the significance of making Dr. Starr's work accessible to Kazakh readers: "The translation of this book into Kazakh is significant for us. Dr. Starr's work offers profound insights into Central Asia's historical contributions to global knowledge and underscores the region’s role as a vibrant hub of intellectual and scientific discourse during the Enlightenment. By reconnecting with the foundations of our region's 'golden age' and learning from both its successes and declines, we can pave the way for a collective future of prosperity and innovation."

    The book was translated and published by the International "Kazakh Language" (Qazak Tili) Society with the support of Freedom Holding Corp. Thanks to the support of the American Foreign Policy Council and Rumsfeld Foundation for hosting and partnering. 

    The International "Kazakh Language" Society (Qazak Tii: www.til.kz) is the largest non-profit organization dedicated to preserving and promoting the Kazakh language and cultural heritage. Through education, translation projects, and international collaborations, the organization aims to bridge cultures and empower future generations to embrace their identity while contributing to a more interconnected and culturally diverse world.

    Freedom Holding Corp. is an international investment company that provides a range of services, including brokerage, dealer, and depositary services, as well as securities management and banking services. The company was founded in 2013 by Timur Turlov, a Kazakh entrepreneur and financier.

    The book is available in the libraries of educational institutions in Kazakhstan, the digital version can be accessed for free on the Kitap.kz portal.

  • Dysfunctional centralization and growing fragility under Taliban rule
    Wednesday, 11 September 2024 14:35

    By Sayed Madadi

    One year ago, on Aug. 31, 2021, the last foreign soldier left Afghanistan. Since then, the situation in the country has only grown more fragile, marked by deteriorating living conditions, widespread human rights violations, and increasing political instability. One key contributing factor to the crisis is a dysfunctional centralized governance structure that has become more paralyzed and unresponsive under Taliban control. The group has greatly aggravated the problem with its rigid religious ideology and exclusive political agenda, but it well predates the Taliban takeover. The situation has steadily deteriorated over the past two decades as a result of a system that undermined local mechanisms of resilience, deprived people of access to basic public services, and marginalized them politically. With the Taliban at the helm, the system now only perpetuates further political exclusion, economic deprivation, and human suffering. The worsening economic conditions and political environment in the last year offer ample evidence of this.

    Ever hungrier population

    According to the most recent data from the World Bank, Afghanistan is now the poorest country in the world and the per capita income has declined to 2006 levels. The Taliban’s return to power exacerbated an already worrisome economic and humanitarian situation. Pushed to the brink by recurrent droughts, chronic cycles of violence, and poor governance, the insurgent offensive that captured Kabul last August created a shockwave that neither the economy nor the people could absorb. Before 2021, the latest poverty rate in Afghanistan was 47% and 35% of people reported that they were unable to meet their basic needs for food and other essential goods. Now, according to the World Bank and the United Nations, more than 95% of the population is poor, with more than 70% suffering from food insecurity. In an undiversified and limited economy that does not have much to offer, only a staggeringly low 2% said that they did not face limitations in spending. Rising prices caused by high inflation, the liquidity crisis, and a massive drop in international trade, coupled with sharply decreased household incomes, have reduced purchasing power for millions and increased unemployment to record levels, even as an estimated 600,000 people enter the labor force annually.

    Many of these sources of fragility, of course, existed before the Taliban came to power. For over a century, Kabul has grown in monetary wealth, human capital, and opportunities at the expense of the rest of Afghanistan. The economic wealth and metropolitan character of the capital has come with the centralization of state power and revenue collection since 1880. For decades, lack of opportunities — and later on conflict — brought the best and the brightest from around Afghanistan to the capital, thus gradually draining the provinces of intellectual capital and economic resources. Historically, the Kabul-based kings gave land titles and trade monopolies to traditional power-holders in return for revenue, while the latter extorted the local population to raise what was required to pay Kabul. The central state relied on the periphery for resources, soldiers, and legitimacy, but hardly provided anything in return.

    The 2004 constitutional architecture did little, if anything, to change that. As foreign funding flowed in at unprecedented levels, the concentration of political power and economic planning in the capital continued to draw resources and talent from the periphery, eroding the foundations of local resilience. Local and provincial power holders and economic tycoons survived only because they maintained strong ties with those who controlled financial wealth and political decision-making at the center. The immense wealth that the Karzais gained in the south or the riches that Atta Mohammad Noor was able to raise in the north were not possible without the backing of central authorities, which in both cases were highly formalized: Ahmad Wali Karzai was the head of Kandahar’s provincial council and Atta served as the governor of the lucrative Balkh Province for over a decade. Staggering levels of corruption and state capture enabled a select group to easily gain control of the country’s economic riches and move them abroad.

    The population was already struggling by the time the Taliban returned to power. Studies and analysis by the U.N., the World Bank, and independent observers had long warned about increasing poverty, unemployment, and cyclical droughts. After last August, the depletion of human resources and economic wealth and the withdrawal of the international presence in Kabul disrupted value production and business enterprise around the country. The crisis has left millions of people helpless, not only because of their reliance on the Kabul-centric legal regulatory framework, but also because most of the job market — the public sector and the NGOs — was funded by donor money from Kabul. The full international withdrawal shrank the economy by more than one-third and the implications of the political crisis disrupted the markets for much longer than the country could afford. After severe drought and conflict displaced over 700,000 people last year, hundreds of thousands have left Afghanistan since August 2021 in search of a better life.

    The Taliban's inability and unwillingness to provide public services and reinvigorate economic activity led to the further deterioration of living conditions and heightened the people’s vulnerability. The World Bank reported that more than 81% of household heads were self-employed after Aug. 15, 2021. An absolute majority of them are not business owners but job seekers turning to physical labor and street vending to avoid starvation. The Taliban authorities claim that they have increased revenue collection at border crossings, mainly by curbing corruption and expanding ports with taxable trade. However, the regime does not provide even basic public services such as education and health with that revenue. For example, nearly half of schools are closed as the Taliban still refuse to allow girls to access secondary education, resulting in a major decline in public spending. Most of the health infrastructure is supported through international humanitarian aid by the U.N. and ICRC, and the extravagant Afghan National Defense and Security Forces no longer exist. On top of that, only a fraction of public servants go to work, and after months of delays they now receive far lower salaries based on the regime’s new pay scale — labor earnings in the public sector have declined by 69%.

    Therefore, without offering social protection, public services, and economic opportunities, the centralized revenue collection continues to further deplete the provinces of resources that could otherwise help them mitigate the risks of economic and environmental shocks. The Taliban's interference in the distribution of humanitarian aid takes away from the neediest people their only means of survival in the midst of destitution, further compounding local fragility. Despite a year of trials and the infusion of more than $2 billion in aid into Afghanistan, the economic and humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate. Although conventional humanitarian assistance programs help people get by in the short term, they also reinforce a relationship of dependency on aid without developing opportunities for employment and private enterprise, thus reinforcing deeper vulnerability. These approaches — coupled with the Taliban’s centralized and unaccountable governance — build on ineffective modalities that disenfranchise local communities, compound economic deprivation, exacerbate environmental shocks, and intensify human suffering.

    A totalitarian regime

    The political and human rights situation has equally deteriorated under the Taliban. While the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission says more than 1,500 people have been killed by the regime since last August, some independent observer groups report that around 2,000 civilians from the Hazara ethnic community alone have been killed. Protests by women have been repeatedly suppressed and participants have been imprisoned, tortured, and killed. The government is populated entirely by Taliban clerics, excluding all other political forces and non-Pashtun groups. The persecution of Tajiks in the name of quelling the military resistance in the north and of Hazaras justified by ethno-sectarian divisions — the latter are mostly Shi’a — continue. Afghanistan is the only country in the world that prevents girls from getting an education by barring them from secondary schools. Most women cannot work, and a woman’s political agency and social status are tied to that of a man, who has to accompany her, fully veiled, anywhere she goes outside the home. According to Reporters Without Borders, 40% of all media outlets in the country have disappeared and 60% of journalists have lost their jobs. The figure for female journalists is even higher, at 76%.

    The Taliban have managed to consolidate their power within an Islamic Emirate that borrows significantly in structural design from its predecessor Islamic Republic, rather than introducing a new institutional architecture. Save for a few tweaks, the broader framework of the system has remained the same. The judiciary system, for example, and its relationship with the head of state have not changed. The Taliban have kept most political and governance institutions as they were, filling positions across the ministries and provinces with their own appointees. The major institutional change the Taliban have brought has been the removal of elections to establish popular legitimacy: The head of state is now a divinely mandated supreme leader, and there is no legislative branch. These alterations, while substantial on paper, have not changed much in practice. Given the highly centralized nature of the republic with an overly powerful president at the top, electoral processes had failed to produce either legitimacy or accountability for much of the last two decades. In many instances, elections provided opportunities for embezzlement and corruption by enabling actors with ulterior motives to buy votes and then abuse public office to enrich themselves. This was particularly true in the case of the parliament and provincial councils, institutions captured by a handful of kleptocrats who failed to keep an overly strong executive in check.

    The binary division of a republic versus an emirate was what bogged down the peace talks until they fell apart in the run-up to the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul. The fact that the group has consolidated its power through the very system it so vehemently rejected says a lot about the actual democratic character of the centralized political institutions. The narrowing of the public space under the Taliban, for example, indicates that the degree of openness for debate and democratic practices before 2021 was not necessarily a byproduct of a meticulous institutional design that checked the use of power and ensured accountability. Rather, it was attributable to the personal commitment to democratic values of those in control. For over a decade, Hamid Karzai, who ruled through tribal consensus and appeasement, enabled a conducive environment in which a vibrant media industry and civil society took root. Across Afghanistan, especially in Kabul and other key urban centers, demonstrations against the government were ubiquitous.

    After 2014 when Ashraf Ghani came to power, the democratic space began to shrink for a variety of reasons, chief among them the intolerance of the president and his inner circle. Crackdowns on public protests, silencing of independent media and civil society, and marginalization of political opponents and critics, including through the use of force, became increasingly common. In order to act with the utmost impunity, Ghani maintained a facade of accountability through the ministries while monopolizing state functions by creating parallel institutions at his own office. Since last August, the Taliban, undeterred by any prospects of accountability, have further centralized the structure by removing the subsidiary units of the Arg, Afghanistan’s presidential palace, and have instead directly utilized the formal government bureaucracy to consolidate their power, implement their extremist views of what an Islamic society should look like, and silence any voices of dissent. In other words, the centralized political and governance institutions of the former republic were unaccountable enough that they now comfortably accommodate the totalitarian objectives of the Taliban without giving the people any chance to resist peacefully.

    What lies ahead

    The Taliban, who claimed to represent rural Afghanistan, have further oppressed and marginalized Afghans outside Kabul as their core members continue to settle in the now dual capitals of Kabul and Kandahar. The Taliban’s thinking about governance based on a rigid interpretation of religion and ethnonationalist politics, as much as it evolves in practice over time, has further centralized political decision-making and economic resources in the hands of a few. As economic resources become more scarce, wealth will be controlled by those who hold political power at the highest levels.

    This will only deepen the drivers of fragility and conflict, including poverty, exclusion, and discrimination. With drought likely to become an annual occurrence by 2030, the financial and banking crisis set to continue for the foreseeable future, and the economy expected to keep shrinking, people across Afghanistan are becoming increasingly vulnerable. Moreover, the unsustainably large but still inadequate humanitarian aid budget, which has offered a minimal lifeline to the country, will be in danger of getting smaller in light of recent security developments that further limit the parameters of international engagement with the regime. The United States has reportedly withheld talks about the possible unfreezing of Afghanistan’s central bank assets held by the U.S. Federal Reserve and the U.N. Security Council has not extended travel exemptions for 13 Taliban leaders. These developments also mean that potential foreign investment, even from friendly partners of the regime, such as China, will likely take a long time to materialize. The overall impact of all of this will be to push Afghans across the country further and deeper into cycles of economic deprivation and political instability with substantial implications for health, education, and human rights, especially for women and children.

    However, as much as centralization allows the Taliban to consolidate power in the short run, it equally makes its long-term survival unlikely. The group led a highly decentralized, mobile insurgency where local commanders oversaw the war in their areas in whatever way they saw fit. That was vital to withstand the republican army and its partners, as well as recruit non-Pashtun commanders in the north, which later proved fatal to the republic. But now they are struggling to transform from a decentralized insurgency into a centralized government and what were previously strengths have become weaknesses. Commanders such as Fasihuddin, once trusted with complete authority, are expected to give up their autonomy and obey orders. The regime is also facing difficulties integrating key battlefield leaders into its new official structures in an appropriate way, as the appointment of Qayum Zaker to an arbitrary assignment managing the resistance in Panjshir illustrates. These trends stemming from the centralization of power will eventually push away those who were key to the Taliban’s success — similar to how President Ghani’s exclusionary politics alienated the republic’s natural allies. The Taliban have long prioritized their cohesion over any other political objective. Now, unable to govern and unwilling to share power with other political forces, the centralized regime’s disintegration becomes increasingly inevitable — and arguably has been expedited — as it fails to incorporate even its own senior political and military leadership into decision-making processes.

    Sayed Madadi is a Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies and a Nonresident Scholar with the Middle East Institute’s Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies Program. You can follow him on Twitter @MadadiSaeid. The opinions expressed in this piece are his own.

     Read at Middle East Institute